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E X EC U TIV E SU M M A RY
A study was conducted to examine the potential benefits of establishing government 
subsidized farm savings accounts for specialty crop growers. The primary goal of the 
project was to determine whether farm savings accounts would provide specialty crop 
growers with a useful tool for managing financial risk. The project examined how 
various features of the farm savings account proposals ultimately impacted the benefits 
that specialty crop growers would receive from the accounts.
Two specific types of farm savings accounts, counter-cyclical farm savings (CC) 
accounts and farm and ranch risk management (FARRM) accounts, were evaluated. Both 
accounts require that the farmer deposit funds into the account. The study evaluated the 
eligibility of specialty crop growers to contribute and withdraw funds from CC and 
FARRM accounts as well as how the use of the accounts would impact farm income 
variability.
Under the counter-cyclical savings accounts program, eligibility is based upon gross 
income, the government would match the farmer’s deposit up to $5,000, and farmers 
could withdraw when gross income fell below a specified trigger level. For FARRM 
accounts, eligibility to participate was based upon positive net income and deposits were 
not matched, but rather were tax deferred. Withdrawals from the accounts were 
evaluated using various historical gross income trigger levels.
The study used data collected by Lake Erie Grape Farm Cost Study (LEGFCS) to analyze 
the proposed farm saving account programs (White and Shaffer). The five year panel 
data set contains the financial records of 32 grape farms that had completed the survey 
for each of the years 2000 to 2004. These farms specialize in the production of native 
variety grapes (Concord and Niagara) which are used for juice. The data collection was 
based upon tax information on the growers’ 1040 Schedule F. The data are not 
necessarily representative of all types of specialty crop production or of the “average”
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specialty crop operation. However, the data should illustrate the relative income 
variability faced by a type of specialty crop growers and potential for farm savings 
accounts in addressing this variability.
The study produced a number of findings that illustrate some of the potential benefits and 
challenges of developing a farm savings account program for specialty crop growers. 
Within the sample of farmers considered the positive net income contribution 
requirement for FARRM accounts was more restrictive than the $50,000 gross income 
requirement for CC accounts. Additionally, because the benefits of the FARRM account 
are based on tax deferral, fewer farms would have incentives to participate as opposed to 
CC accounts. Based on farm income alone nearly half of the farms in the study were in 
the 10% or lower marginal federal income tax bracket. Similarly, larger and more 
profitable farms would receive the greatest benefits from the FARRM account program.
On average, the size of farmer deposits to both types of accounts were similar, but when 
the government match is considered, the average CC account balance was larger than the 
average FARRM account balance. The ability of farms to make withdrawals from the 
account is very dependent upon the nature of the withdrawal provisions. For instance, if 
withdrawal triggers are not indexed to allow for growth, few farms will be able to make 
withdrawals. Restrictive withdrawal rules will significantly reduce the appeal of the 
accounts as a risk management tool.
The accounts showed promise in their ability to reduce income variability. However, 
restrictions on the size of deposits will limit the accounts’ ability to completely mitigate 
income variability. Many farms will still experience considerable income variability. 
The accounts also appear unable to handle yearly back-to-back adverse financial 
outcomes. Unless larger subsidies are offered, savings account programs are unlikely to 
provide a complete risk management solution for specialty crop growers. Additionally, 
for widest appeal the program should combine both government deposit matching and tax 
deferral of deposits.
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IN T R O D U C T IO N  -  FARM  SAVINGS A C C O U N TS
Managing the financial risk associated with farming is a central concern for farmers.
Farm revenue insurance products have shown promise in helping farmers manage income 
risk and comprise an important component of the federal farm safety net. However, there 
is evidence that specialty crop growers are not completely satisfied with the risk 
protection provided by existing crop insurance policies (White, Uva, and Cheng, 2003). 
Farm savings accounts are a related product that may have considerable appeal to 
specialty crop growers.
Farm savings accounts are based upon the idea of providing producers financial 
incentives to set aside funds in high income years for use in low income years. Like 
revenue insurance products, most farm savings account proposals rely upon tax records to 
determine eligibility for contributions and withdrawals from the accounts. Unlike 
revenue insurance products, the producer does not pay a premium, but rather places funds 
in a deposit account. These funds remain the property of the producer. Additionally, 
deposits to the account may be tax deferred, and/or matched by a deposit from the 
government. Although the cost of a savings account program will depend upon the 
specific design, farm savings accounts may also appeal to policy makers because the cost 
to the federal government is likely to be relatively low compared to direct subsidy 
programs and emergency financial assistance.
A variety of farm savings accounts proposals have been advanced in the United States 
and in other countries1. The general idea behind farm savings accounts is to provide 
farmers incentives to save funds in high income years for use in low income years. The 
most commonly suggested incentives include tax deferral and/or a government matching 
deposit. Proposals for matching deposits often contain provisions that limit withdrawals 
from the accounts to years in which income falls below a specified trigger level.
The research project evaluated two specific proposals, counter-cyclical farm savings (CC) 
accounts and farm and ranch risk management (FARRM) accounts. Both proposals 
require that the farmer deposit funds into the account. Under the counter-cyclical savings 
accounts program, eligibility is based upon gross income, the government would match 
the farmer’s deposit up to $5,000, and farmers could withdraw when gross income fell 
below a specified trigger level. For FARRM accounts, eligibility to participate was based 
upon positive net income and deposits were not matched, but rather were tax deferred. 
Withdrawals from the accounts were evaluated using various historical gross income 
trigger levels.
1 Edelman, Monke, and Durst; Monke and Durst; and Ellinger and Gloy provide a discussion and analysis 
of the various types of farm savings account proposals. Makki and Somwaru describe farm savings 
account experiences in Canada and Australia.
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This study used the data collected by Lake Erie Grape Farm Cost Study (LEGFCS) to 
analyze the proposed farm saving account programs. The analyses focused on two 
specific savings account proposals. The proposals considered are often referred to as farm 
and ranch risk management accounts (FARRM) and counter cyclical savings accounts 
(CC). The data set contains grape farms that had completed the survey for each of the 
years 2000 to 2004. The five-year panel contains the financial records of 32 grape farms. 
The data collection was based upon tax information from growers’ IRS Form 1040, 
Schedule F information (White and Shaffer, 2003). Because the implementation of both 
FARRM and CC account proposals would rely upon tax information, the present study 
considers the variability in measures of taxable income. These measures do not 
necessarily reflect the actual or accrual profitability of the farms under consideration.
Two measures of farm income were calculated to assess several aspects of the proposed 
farm savings account programs. An important difference between FARRM and CC 
accounts is that they are based on different measures of income to determine eligibility. 
FARRM accounts are driven by a measure of net income, while CC accounts are driven 
by a measure of gross farm income.
Similarly, the benefits for the programs differ. The main benefit from FARRM accounts 
is tax deferral and possible tax exemption, while CC accounts provide farmers a matching 
government deposit. Finally, the ability to withdraw funds is different for the accounts. 
Withdrawal from FARRM accounts is not restricted, while withdrawal from CC accounts 
is subject to shortfalls from a gross income target. Each of these issues is examined for 
both of the accounts. Therefore, the analysis focuses on addressing four broad questions. 
Specifically, we analyze:
1) variability in the measure of net farm income (FARRM) and variability in the 
measure of gross farm income (CC ),
2) the ability of farmers to contribute to FARRM and CC accounts; and,
3) withdrawals from and benefits obtained by contributing to FARRM and CC 
accounts;
4) the impacts of the FARRM and CC accounts on shortfalls and income stabilization
The report proceeds by first analyzing FARRM accounts, then CC accounts are 
considered. The analysis of each account begins by describing the proposal. Then the 
variability of the appropriate income measure is described, gross income for FARRM and 
net income for CC accounts. Based on the assumptions about eligibility the analysis 
considers how frequently farms would be eligible to make deposits and the magnitude of 
the deposits for which producers are eligible. Because the benefits of FARRM are tied to 
tax deferral the FARRM analysis considers the income tax liability of the farms in the 
study. Then, the study examines the extent to which farmers are eligible to make 
withdrawals from the accounts and the extent to which the available account balances 
would cover the needed withdrawals. Each section concludes by examining the impact of 
the accounts on farm income variability.
Data Used in the Analysis of FARRM and CC Accounts
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FARRM Accounts
The FARRM account proposal uses tax deferral as an incentive for farmer saving. 
Although a variety of proposals have surfaced, the analyses in this report follow the basic 
idea that FARRM accounts would allow farmers to take a Federal income tax deduction 
for a deposit of up to 20 percent of eligible farm income. Eligible farm income is defined 
as taxable net farm income from Schedule F of IRS Form 1040 (Durst, 2004). The 
measure of net income used in the analysis is calculated as:
(1) net income = Schedule F  gross farm income - Schedule F  farm expenses
with
Schedule F gross farm income = cash receipts from the sale o f farm products
Schedule F farm expenses = cash expenses + depreciation
In order to understand the potential benefit of FARRM accounts, it is important to 
examine the net income variability faced by farmers. The descriptive statistics for net 
income provide a straightforward examination of net income fluctuations. Table 1 
presents the summary of net income among Lake Erie grape growers between 2000 and 
2004. There is a substantial amount of net income variability over the five-year period. 
The average net income ranges from $14,125 to $20,657. For the panel, the standard 
deviation of net income is greater than the mean, indicating a wide dispersion in the 
amount of variability experienced by these farms. The standard deviation as a measure of 
volatility implies that the year-to-year net income variability at the individual farm level 
could be even greater than the variability shown by a group of farms. There are several 
factors that might cause variation in net income from year to year. These would include 
price changes (both input and output), variation in production levels, and changes in farm 
size.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Net Income by Year, 32 Grape Farms in Lake Erie 
Region.__________________________________________________________________
Year Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
2000 $14,125 $28,486 ($44,275) $75,795
2001 $18,965 $23,980 ($49,079) $60,978
2002 $17,929 $27,663 ($53,662) $74,359
2003 $20,657 $41,934 ($54,757) $139,671
2004 $15,148 $24,041 ($40,750) $53,950
Total $17,365 $29,680 ($54,757) $139,671
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FARRM Accounts: Eligibility, Deposits, and Participation Incentives
The analysis of FARRM accounts considered whether farmers would be eligible to place 
deposits in the account, the magnitude of eligible deposits, and producers’ incentives for 
making deposits.
Eligibility
The eligibility to make a deposit to a FARRM account is dependent upon the farm having 
a positive net income. That is,
(2) Eligible to contribute to a FARRM account, i f  net income > 0
The first step in the analysis was to examine how frequently individual farms would be 
able to contribute over the 5-year period. Two farms were never eligible for the FARRM 
program due to having negative net income for 5 consecutive years. That is, 93.8% of 
farms are eligible to establish FARRM accounts. Because these farms were not able to 
establish an account over the 5-year period, the subsequent FARRM account analyses 
exclude these farms. The results in Table 2 show the percent of farms able to make up to 
5 contributions to a FARRM account. Thirty-seven percent of farms would be eligible to 
contribute for the entire period. The results also indicate that many growers would find 
years when they are unable to contribute to a FARRM account. This would suggest that 
they would want to withdraw income from the accounts in these years to offset the low 
net income.
Table 2. Percent of Farms with Net Income Enabling them to Contribute to FARRM 
Accounts, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region, 2000-2004.______________________
Number of Years Qualified to Contribute % of Farms
1 3.3
2 10.0
3 26.7
4 23.3
5 36.7
The proportion of farms with a positive net income to be eligible for FARRM accounts 
also varies by year (Table 3). The smallest proportion of farms would qualify in 2003 
when only 63 percent of farms had a positive net income. The results would suggest that 
in any given year we would expect nearly 75% of the farmers to be eligible to make a 
contribution.
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Although well over half of the farms would be eligible to contribute to a FARRM account 
every year, it is important to remember that many farms will show a positive net income 
and still pay no taxes because of standard or itemized deductions and personal 
exemptions. Thus, those farms with the low-income levels would have little incentive to 
contribute to FARRM accounts. The issues of tax deferral and tax deduction will be 
examined separately in the section of analyzing grower participation incentives. When 
calculating potential deposits to the accounts, this issue is not considered. Rather, the 
analysis considers whether growers would have positive net income to be eligible to 
contribute to FARRM accounts assuming that non-farm income would exactly offset the 
standard deductions available to the farm in the analyses of FARRM accounts.
Deposits to FARRM Accounts
The next step in the analysis was to calculate the amount of funds eligible for deposit. 
Eligible growers were assumed to contribute 20 percent of their net income to the 
FARRM accounts. That is for any given year i the deposit was calculated according to
(3),
(3) deposit i = 20% * net income i , i f  eligible to contribute in year i.
There is some incentive to make such a deposit because the contribution can be 
withdrawn at any time and it allows the grower to defer the tax for a minimum of one 
year. For example, a grower could make a deposit in December of year 1, or likely up to 
April 15 of year 2, and then withdraw the funds early in year 2. Federal income taxes are 
then deferred for a year and, if the funds must be borrowed, only a few days of interest 
are incurred to obtain use of the funds. Additionally, the deposited funds are eligible to 
earn interest making the net cost relatively small. Deferral opens the possibility that the 
grower could reduce the tax rate (possibly to zero) on some of the deposited funds, if 
their taxable income fell in the subsequent year(s). However, the estimates of deposits 
clearly overstate what might realistically be deposited since we assume that growers will 
participate fully if eligible and ignore the issue of tax deduction.
Under the 20% contribution rule, average annual deposits to FARRM accounts ranged 
from $3,951 to $5,519 (Table 3). As expected, the average deposits from year-to-year 
closely follow the average net income of the farms for that year. Also, a typical farm 
would annually contribute slightly over $4,500 to the account over a 5-year period. 
Depending upon the tax bracket this would result in a small amount of tax deferral. The 
final balances in the account will depend upon the amount of the deposits that are 
withdrawn in any given year.
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Table 3. Percent of Farms with Income Enabling them to Contribute to FARRM 
Accounts and Deposit Summary of FARRM Accounts per Year, 30 Grape Farms in Lake 
Erie Region.______________________________________________________________
Eligible Deposit
Year % of Farms Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
2000 73.3 $3,951 $4,635 $0 $15,159
2001 86.7 $4,476 $4,041 $0 $12,196
2002 80.0 $4,606 $4,337 $0 $14,872
2003 63.3 $5,519 $7,477 $0 $27,934
2004 76.7 $4,078 $3,557 $0 $10,790
All Year 76.0 $4,526 $4,967 $0 $27,934
Participation Incentives for FARRM Accounts
There are two important financial incentives to encourage FARRM account participation. 
The most basic benefit obtained by contributing to the account is the deferral of tax 
liability for one year or more. The ability to defer taxes to a tax year in which the farm is 
in a lower tax bracket would result in lower taxes, creating an incentive for contribution 
to a FARRM account. For instance, a farmer could contribute to a FARRM account in a 
year in which the income would be taxed at the 27% marginal tax bracket and then 
withdraw the funds in a year where they find themselves in a lower tax bracket (Table 4). 
Unless the tax rate on the funds in the year they are removed is less than in the year of the 
deposit, the advantage is the deferral of taxes. The deferral of taxes allows the farmer to 
invest the deferred taxes and earn interest income (which is taxable).
Table 4. The Marginal Tax Brackets of Taxable Income.
Marginal Tax Brackets Income
0% $0
10% $12,000
15% $46,700
27% $112,850
30% $171,950
35% $307,050
38.60% >$307,050
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The marginal tax bracket and a farmer’s movement among the various brackets play 
critical roles in determining the ultimate value of FARRM accounts. The greatest benefit 
obtained from FARRM accounts occurs when farmers can contribute in years with a high 
tax liability and withdraw in years with a reduced tax liability. Although many of the 
farmers have a positive net income, the standard deduction will allow many of the farms 
to avoid tax liability. Growers whose net income is low are unlikely to pay income taxes, 
thereby reducing the incentive for participation.
In order to assess the tax situation, the grower’s marginal tax bracket was determined 
with and without deposits to FARRM accounts and with and without standard 
deductions. The analysis assumes the standard deduction for a married couple filing 
jointly ($7,850) and two personal exemptions ($6,000) for a total deduction from net 
taxable farm income of $13,850. This results in 4 possible scenarios. The analysis does 
not consider any income other than farm income and makes no allowances for deductions 
for state income tax or self-employment taxes or other credits.
Table 5 shows the percent of growers in various tax brackets under the four combinations 
of taxable net income with/without deductions and with/without deposits to FARRM 
accounts. The table allows on to assess how the deductions might impact farmers’ 
incentives to make deposits. The key to this analysis is to consider the change in the 
percent of growers that would be eligible to contribute to FARRM accounts if taxable net 
income is reduced by the amount of the standard deduction. In order to make this 
calculation one can compare the percent of growers in the zero marginal tax bracket 
under the case without deposits/without deduction (column 3) and the percent in the zero 
bracket without deposit/with deduction (column 5) in Table 5. After applying the 
deductions, the number of farms that would be eligible for FARRM accounts falls by 23.3 
percentage points on average. This is a substantial decrease in the number of farmers that 
would receive any benefits from the accounts.
Table 5 also allows one to begin to assess the movement in tax brackets caused by 
contributions to FARRM accounts. In the cases without deductions and exemptions 
(columns 3 & 4), the contributions to FARRM accounts cause small proportions of the 
farmers to switch income tax brackets. For instance, no farms are found in the 30% 
bracket after the deposits and fewer are in the 27% bracket, with slightly more farmers in 
the 10% and 15% brackets. In the scenarios that consider deductions and exemptions 
(column 5 & 6), the contributions to FARRM accounts also cause relatively small 
proportions of the farmers to switch income tax brackets. Incorporating the deductions 
and exemptions with the FARRM accounts results in fewer farms with a tax liability. 
However, most of the shifts in income tax brackets occur from the highest tax bracket 
through the lowest. Generally speaking, no matter whether tax deduction is subtracted or 
not, as a result of contributions to FARRM accounts, the farms initially found in the 
higher brackets are more likely to switch the tax brackets than farms initially found in 
lower tax brackets.
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An analysis was also conducted to determine the percent of farms that switched tax 
brackets as a result of their contribution to a FARRM account. The analysis considers 
both the case where standard deductions were allowed and the case where they were 
ignored. Table 6 presents this analysis for each year of the study. For instance, the second 
column of Table 6 shows that in the year 2002, by making a deposit to the account 13.3 
percent of the farms would benefit from a lower tax bracket if standard deductions are not 
considered. When the standard deduction was considered, making a deposit would cause 
30 percent of the farms switch to a lower bracket. Overall, the average proportions of 
farms switching income tax bracket over the entire period are 13.3% when the deductions 
are ignored and 20% when the deductions are considered (Table 6).
The number of times that making a deposit would cause a farm switch tax brackets was 
also calculated. Table 7 shows these frequencies for the case where the standard 
deduction is considered and when it is ignored. These results further illustrate the 
findings previously presented in Table 5. Specifically, that making a FARRM deposit 
would not result in a great deal of tax bracket shifting. For instance, 50 percent of the 
farms would never switch tax brackets with a deposit under the no standard deduction 
assumption. The percentage benefiting slightly increases when standard deductions are 
considered.
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Table 5. Percent of Farms in Various Tax Brackets Assuming Taxable Net Income with / 
without Deductions and with / without Maximum Contribution to FARRM Accounts, 30 
Grape Farms, 2000-2004.___________________________________________________
Taxable Net Income
Marginal Tax No Deposit With DepositA No Deposit With Deposit
Year Brackets No Deductions No Deductions With DeductionsB With Deductions
2000 0% 26.7 26.7 60.0 63.3
10% 30.0 36.7 3.3 6.7
15% 26.7 30.0 30.0 26.7
27% 16.7 6.7 6.7 3.3
2001 0% 13.3 13.3 40.0 46.7
10% 26.7 30.0 20.0 23.3
15% 43.3 50.0 33.3 30.0
27% 16.7 6.7 6.7 -
2002 0% 20.0 20.0 40.0 53.3
10% 13.3 23.3 20.0 16.7
15% 53.3 46.7 33.3 30.0
27% 13.3 10.0 6.7 -
2003 0% 36.7 36.7 50.0 53.3
10% 10.0 13.3 16.7 20.0
15% 30.0 26.7 10.0 13.3
27% 20.0 23.3 20.0 13.3
30% 3.3 - 3.3 -
2004 0% 23.3 23.3 46.7 46.7
10% 20.0 23.3 13.3 23.3
15% 43.3 53.3 40.0 30.0
27% 13.3 - - -
Total 0% 24.0 24.0 47.3 52.7
10% 20.0 25.3 14.7 18.0
15% 39.3 41.3 29.3 26.0
27% 16.0 9.3 8.0 3.3
30% 0.7 - 0.7 -
A The net taxable income is deducted by the amount of grower’s contributions to FARRM accounts 
B The analysis assumes that net taxable farm income is subtracted by the amount of the standard deduction 
for married filing jointly of $7,850 and two personal exemptions ($6,000 total).
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Table 6. Percent of Farms Changing Income Tax Brackets as a Result of a Contribution to
FARRM Accounts, by Year, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.
Subtract Deductions from Farm Income
Year No Yes
2000 16.7 13.3
2001 13.3 23.3
2002 13.3 30.0
2003 6.7 23.3
2004 16.7 10.0
All Period 13.3 20.0
Table 7. Number of Years that Farms Switched Income Tax Brackets as a Result of 
Contributions to FARRM Accounts, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region, 2000-2004.
Number of Years Income Tax Subtract Deductions from Farm Income
Basket Change No Yes
0 50.0 43.3
1 36.7 30.0
2 10.0 13.3
3 3.3 10.0
4 - 3.3
5 - -
FARRM Accounts: Withdrawals and Benefits
In order to estimate withdrawals from FARRM accounts and the benefits obtained by 
depositing funds in the accounts one must make additional assumptions. In doing so it is 
useful to examine the possible motivations and benefits that might accrue by contributing 
to FARRM accounts. The most basic benefit obtained by contributing to the account is 
the deferral of tax liability for one year or more. Because the farmer must eventually 
withdraw the funds, the contribution is a deferral unless the contribution is withdrawn 
when the farmer is in a lower tax bracket resulting in taxation at a lower rate, possibly 
zero. The deferral of taxes allows the farmer to invest funds and earn interest income. 
The benefit of investing these funds can be expressed as:
(4) benefiti = (balance_  + depositi) * (tt )(r )(1 -  )
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where benefiti is the net benefit in year i of deferring taxes on the amount available to 
withdraw in the account in year i, ( balancei-1 + depositi), ti is the marginal tax rate in
year i, and r is the rate of return earned on the deferred taxes. The benefit arises from the 
farmer’s use of funds that would otherwise be paid to the government. This amount is 
the balance plus the deposit multiplied by the marginal tax rate. The analysis assumes 
that these funds are invested at rate r, and that earnings on those funds are distributed and 
taxed. Thus, the ulimate benefit is the earnings times 1 minus the marginal tax rate. The 
cumulative balance in the account was estimated by adding the maximum contribution in 
any year i to previous year’s balance and subtracting any withdrawals from the account.
(5) balance i = balance i-i + depositi -  withdrawali
Therefore in order to estimate the benefit in any given year it was necessary to estimate 
the withdrawals from the accounts. Although withdrawals from FARRM accounts would 
be at the farmer's discretion, the relationship in equations (6)-(9) was used to estimate 
withdrawals from the accounts. We assume that withdrawals were made when current 
year income was less than 90% (or 80%) of the income target. In this case, the farmer 
would withdraw enough funds from the accounts to increase income to the 90% (or 80%) 
level of the target. The withdrawal was the lesser of the balance in the account in the 
previous period plus the deposit in the current year and the need for funds. The need for 
funds to be withdrawn from the account is given by (7), where the parameter, <p was 
assumed to be equal to 0.9 or 0.8 to represent the level of income target. The measure of 
income target in equation (8) was defined to represent a 5-year rolling average of income. 
Equation (9) defines income as either gross or net income. Under this mechanism 
farmers would use the accounts to smooth their income. The rules of withdrawal based on 
income targets can be summarized by (6).
(6) withdrawal
Min[needi, balancet-1 + depositt ] 
0 , otherwise
if  needt > 0
(7) needt = Max[[* target -  incomet ),0], ] 0 . 9  or 0.8
4+ j
Z i n c o m e i994+i
(8) target1999+i = —-----5--------- j  = 1,2,3,4,5
(9) income e  {gross Income, net Income}
The study period covers the years 2000 to 2004, but the calculation of the target income 
requires data for the period of 1995 to 1999. This data was available for most of the 
farms in the panel. In situations where it was missing it was estimated from the 
relationship between the farms average returns and the group returns. The exact 
estimation procedure follows that described in Gloy, LaDue and Cuykendall.
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Durst (2004) points out the implications of utilizing a tax-based measure of income for 
major farm savings account proposals. Normally farmers use cash accounting instead of 
accrual accounting for tax purpose. This flexibility with regard to the timing of income 
recognition as well as other tax rules especially related to the recovery of capital 
investments can have a substantial influence on the level and variability of both gross and 
net farm income. Farmers can accelerate or defer income or expenses to smooth income 
and avoid potentially higher marginal income tax rates that could apply under the 
progressive income tax system. This would reduce farm income variability. Thus, the 
assumptions of withdrawal based on Federal income tax data, especially if the criteria are 
based on net farm income rather than gross receipts, may not be a good indicator of the 
need to withdraw funds from the account. Therefore, to estimate the need to withdrawal 
effectively, the measures of income target were constructed for both gross income and net 
income. Gross income was the estimate of the gross schedule F income.
Two measures of income with another design parameter, <p in equation (7) provide four 
scenarios of withdrawal as well as benefit of tax deferral for the analysis of FARRM 
accounts. The four scenarios can be denoted as 90_net (^=.9, income=net income), 
80_net (^= .8, income = net income), 90_gross (^=.9, income = gross income), and 
80_gross (^= .8, income =gross income). For example, under scenario 90_net, the 
amount of withdrawal from the account made in year 2003 could be calculated by (10).
5
2  (net income) 1997+i
(10) 90_net20o3 = (0.9 * —--------- 5------------  ) -  (net Income)2003
There is another serious concern for farms that are experiencing growth in revenues over 
time. To recognize the growth of farm business, using the five-year rolling average gross 
income as the income target might not represent the most scale of the farm business and 
therefore understate growers’ effective need. Considering this situation, we use the 
indexing calculation developed for the Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) Crop Insurance 
Programs to obtain another measure of income target . This indexed income target is 
calculated by the index times the 5- year rolling average income target if the farm 
qualifies for indexing (11). The farm qualifies for indexing, if at least one of the two most 
recent years of gross income is greater than 5-year average gross income, in which case 
the income target may be adjusted upward (12). If the farm does not qualify for indexing, 
the income target remains 5-year rolling average gross income. 2
2 A description of AGR and the income indexing procedure can be found on the USDA, Risk Management 
Agency website, RMA (http://www.rma.usda.gov/) or is available from the authors.
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(11) index targetI999+j <
4+ j
2 (gross income) 1994+i
index * —--------------------------
5
j  = 1,2,3,4,5 i f  qualify
4+ j2 (gross income) 1994+i
—--------------------------  j  = 1,2,3,4,5 otherwise
(12) qualify in any given year (1999+j), iff
4+ j2 (gross income) 1994+i
(gross income1999+j or gross income1998+j) > —-------------------------- j  = 1,2,3,4,5
where index is calculated as follows: 1)Divide each year’s income by the preceding 
year’s income = factor, which is no less than .800 and no greater than 1.200. 2) Take 
average of total factors = factor average. 3) Take fourth power of factor average = index. 
By using the indexed income target in (11) to recognize the growth of farm business, we 
add two more scenarios of withdrawal as well as benefit in the analysis. These two 
scenarios will be denoted as 90_index, given ^=0.9, income= gross income, and the 
index target and 80_index, given ^= .8, income= gross income, and the index target.
Under scenario 90_index, if a grower qualifies for the indexed income target, the amount 
of withdrawal from the account made in year 2003 is calculated according to:
5
2  (gross income) 1997+i
(13) 90_index2003 = 0.9 * index * —---------------------------- (gross Income)2003
Withdrawals and Benefits of Tax Deferral
Given two measures of income (net income and gross income), the level of income target 
(90% and 80%) and the indexed income target, six scenarios were analyzed to estimate 
withdrawals and benefits for FARRM accounts. Withdrawals from the accounts were 
estimated assuming that when income in the current year is less than 90% (or 80%) level 
of the income target, farmers have the need (need, in equation (7) > 0) to withdraw funds 
to smooth income.
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Table 8 shows the percent of growers having the need to withdraw funds from FARRM 
accounts by year. Because the 90% level of income target is higher than 80% level of 
income target, growers will withdraw funds more frequently under a 90% target. The 
only question is how many growers would benefit from a higher net income target. The 
results suggest that under a net income target the frequency that growers have the need to 
withdraw is not substantially greater than the 80 percent target. Over the entire period, 
the average number of farms with a positive need was only 4.7 percentage points greater 
with a 90% net income target than with an 80% net income target.
Table 8. Percent of Farms Qualifying to Make Withdrawals from FARRM Accounts
Under Various Income Targets, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.____________
Withdrawal Scenarios
Year 90 net 80 net 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 50.0% 46.7% 3.3% 3.3% 63.3% 53.3%
2001 43.3% 43.3% 10.0% 23.3% 53.3% 30.0%
2002 40.0% 36.7% 30.0% 13.3% 53.3% 33.3%
2003 50.0% 46.7% 30.0% 6.7% 46.7% 33.3%
2004 56.7% 43.3% 30.0% - 46.7% 6.7%
Entire Period 48.0% 43.3% 20.7% 9.3% 52.7% 31.3%
The results also indicate that using gross income to set the target would be the most 
restrictive rule for estimating farmer’s annual need to withdraw from FARRM account. 
Under an 80% gross income target, on average only 9.3 percent were eligible to make a 
withdrawal. After indexing gross income to reflect growth in the farm business, the 
proportion of farmers with a need for withdrawals increases to 52.7% and 31.3%.
Table 9 shows how frequently individual farms had the need to withdraw from the 
accounts over the five-year period. This data indicates that the net and gross indexed 
income triggers produce similar results, but that the non-indexed gross income targets 
results in many farmers being unable to make withdrawals from the accounts. For 
instance, using a 80% gross income trigger 63.3% of the growers would be unable to 
make a withdrawal from the account.
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Table 9. Percent of Farms Having the Need to Withdraw Funds from FARRM Accounts, 
30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region, 2000-2004._______________________________
Number of years 
with the need to 
withdraw funds
Withdrawal Scenarios
90 net 80 net 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
0 yr 10.0 13.3 43.3 63.3 3.3 16.7
1 yr 16.7 20.0 23.3 30.0 20.0 30.0
2 yrs 20.0 23.3 20.0 3.3 10.0 40.0
3 yrs 33.3 26.7 13.3 3.3 50.0 6.7
4 yrs 16.7 13.3 - - 10.0 6.7
5 yrs 3.3 3.3 - - 6.7 -
The average withdrawals required to bring income back to the target vary considerably 
under the six scenarios (Table 10). The range of average withdrawal over the entire 
period is from $670 under the scenario 80_gross to $3,060 under the scenario 90_index. 
Given the nature of taxable farm income, it is actually difficult to decide which income 
target trigger would be the most meaningful for estimating withdrawals. Furthermore, 
withdrawals from the funds would be at the farmer’s discretion. However, these six 
scenarios would provide the estimates of withdrawal that are necessary to estimate the 
balances in the accounts and the benefits of tax deferral.
Table 10. Average Withdrawals from FARRM Accounts, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie 
Region.__________________________________________________________________
Withdrawal Scenarios
Year 90 net 80 net 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 $471 $239 $0 $0 $2,498 $2,026
2001 $3,219 $2,085 $412 $29 $3,172 $1,090
2002 $3,124 $3,222 $2,724 $2,424 $2,493 $2,002
2003 $1,835 $2,506 $2,692 $679 $4,257 $2,657
2004 $4,469 $3,916 $1,663 $216 $3,032 $216
Entire Period $2,624 $2,394 $1,498 $670 $3,090 $1,598
Equation (4) was used to calculate the potential earnings on the funds given the estimates 
of balance in the accounts, the estimates of deposit to the accounts, the income tax 
brackets, and an interest rate of 5%. The after-tax earnings on these funds are a net 
benefit to the farm. Table 11 shows the average benefits over the 5-year period obtained 
by the farmers under the six scenarios. The average benefits obtained through the tax 
deferral are quite small and less than $100 under any scenario.
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Furthermore, those estimates would overstate the benefits received by investing deferred 
taxes in any given year, because it does not consider any opportunity costs for the funds. 
For instance, if the farm could pay down debt with these funds, the benefits would likely 
be negative unless the rate of return in the account, r, is quite high. The results may imply 
that the benefits from the deferred taxes would not stimulate the grower participation for 
the FARRM account programs if bonus interest rates are not offered.
Table 11. Summary of Annual and Cumulative Tax Deferral Benefits from FARRM
Benefit Scenarios Mean Median Std. Dev
90 net $68.5 $29.6 $101.0
80 net $73.0 $31.4 $106.0
90 gross $82.8 $39.8 $121.0
80_gross $86.0 $41.5 $123.0
90 index $57.6 $25.5 $98.0
80 index $71.2 $33.2 $111.0
When one considers the final balances remaining in the accounts it is obvious that the 
amounts of final balances would be negatively related with the amounts of withdrawal
under the six scenarios. In the scenarios of 90 gross and 80 _gross, FARRM accounts
could offer the ability to build a sizeable self-insurance safety net over a period of several 
years. This is understandable as there were few withdrawals from the accounts in these
two scenarios (Table 12).
Table 12. Summary of Final Balances in FARRM Accounts, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie
Region.
Balance Scenarios Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
90 net $9,512 $3,660 $14,012 $52,776 $0
80 net $10,663 $3,660 $15,116 $57,542 $0
90_gross $15,934 $8,308 $17,275 $57,773 $0
80_gross $19,282 $12,266 $17,928 $57,773 $0
90 index $7,199 $2,556 $11,392 $54,265 $0
80 index $14,639 $7,684 $16,298 $57,773 $0
FARRM Accounts: Income Shortfalls and Stabilization
While some farms could build positive account balances, a significant number of farms 
that experienced a drop in income sufficient to trigger a withdrawal would not have a 
large enough account balance to bring their income back to the target level. Analyses 
were conducted to determine if the balances in the FARMM accounts were sufficient to 
overcome major fluctuations in farm income. The amount by which the need for the 
withdrawal exceeded the balance was calculated according to (14).
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(14) shortfall = need - balance^ + depositt , i f  needt > 0 and shortfall ,■ > 0 
= 0, otherwise
If the amount of funds in the account is not sufficient to fund the need, this grower would 
experience a shortfall (i.e. shortfall, > 0), and this grower’s annual balance would become 
zero. The zero balance would leave the grower with no risk protection going forward. An 
indicator variable was created to count the frequencies of the shortfall (zero balance) for 
each of the four scenarios. This variable was recorded as a one if the shortfall is greater 
than zero and a zero otherwise.
Table 13 shows the percent of farms that experience a shortfall per year. The frequencies 
of shortfalls under the six scenarios are highly correlated with the frequencies of having 
the need to withdraw funds from FARRM accounts shown in Table 8. Because there are 
fewer withdrawals with a gross income target the frequencies of shortfalls in the
scenarios of 90_gross and 80_gross are substantially less than the other four scenarios. 
Table 13. Percent of Farms Experiencing Shortfall, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.
Shortfall Scenarios
Year 90 net 80 net 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 43% 43% 3% - 67% 50%
2001 27% 23% 7% 7% 43% 17%
2002 33% 23% 23% 13% 47% 30%
2003 50% 47% 20% 10% 43% 17%
2004 33% 33% 13% 3% 23% 3%
Entire period 37% 34% 13% 7% 45% 23%
Table 14 shows the conditional average shortfall calculated asE 1[shortfalli\shortfalli > o],
which indicates the average amount of insufficient funds after making a withdrawal when 
a shortfall occurs. The average shortfalls over the entire period are substantial, ranging 
from $17,862 to $29,344. The scenarios of 90_net and 80_net have the lowest average 
shortfalls over the entire period. The conditional average shortfalls vary by year as well 
as by the scenarios, because large amounts of shortfall occurred for some of individual 
farms in a year or in a scenario. For example, the scenarios of 90_gross and 80_gross had 
only 2 growers (7%) experiencing the shortfalls in 2001, but had substantially larger 
average shortfalls ($41,680 and $31,102) than the other four scenarios.
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Table 14. Average Annual Shortfall^ 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.
Year
Shortfall Scenarios
90 net 80 net 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 $19,741 $18,086 $5,102 - $42,075 $27,336
2001 $10,928 $9,980 $41,680 $31,102 $18,149 $22,081
2002 $17,904 $18,978 $23,019 $18,682 $27,463 $18,658
2003 $20,247 $17,893 $21,200 $20,002 $31,768 $38,963
2004 $17,347 $14,663 $16,659 $33,977 $13,017 $33,977
Entire period $17,862 $16,372 $22,171 $23,092 $29,344 $26,205
aThe shortfall is the amount by which the need for a withdrawal exceeds the available 
account balance.
The extent to which the FARRM account was capable of providing stabilization was 
assessed by comparing the shortfalls from the income target for farmers with and without 
FARRM accounts. The amount of shortfall with the existence of a FARRM account has 
been defined as (14). We assume that without a FARRM account, farmers would 
experience shortfalls when income is less than 80% level or 90% level of the target. That 
is, the need defined as (7) is greater than zero when a shortfall occurs. Therefore, the 
amount of shortfall without the existence of a FARRM account is defined as (15).
(15) Shortfall_basei = need, i f  need > 0
= 0, otherwise
Table 15 shows the average shortfalls, number of farms experiencing shortfalls, standard 
deviation of the shortfalls, and the maximum shortfalls with and without the existence of 
FARRM accounts. To compare the shortfalls with and without FARRM accounts, we 
calculate the change on descriptive statistics of shortfalls while FARRM accounts exist. 
Those changes can be interpreted as the effect of FARRM accounts on income 
stabilization.
Under the six scenarios, the FARRM accounts reduced 19% to 34% of the average 
shortfall over the entire period, 18% to 39% of number of farms experiencing shortfalls, 
and 5% to 14% of standard deviation of shortfall over the entire period. The small degree 
of change on the standard deviation is undesirable, because it may imply that FARRM 
accounts reduced a very limited amount of variation in shortfalls across farms. Also, 
scenario 90_index had the least changes on those statistics compared to other three 
scenarios. This implies that using 90% indexed gross income target to set the withdrawal 
restriction could be too strict to show the effect of CC accounts on the income 
stabilization. It may also imply that 90% indexed gross income target overstates growers’ 
needs for income smoothing.
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Table 15. Summary of the Shortfall with and without FARRM Accounts, 30 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region, Continues.
_______________________________ Shortfall Scenarios with / without FARRM Accounts*________________________
90_net 90_net 80_net 80_net 90_G 90_G_ 80_G 80_G Chang 90_I 90_I 80_I 80_I
Year FARRM base Change FARRM base Change FARRM base Change FARRM base e FARRM base Change FARRM base Change
Mean
2000 8,554 9,025 -5% 7,837 8,076 -3% 170 170 0% 0 0 - 28,050 30,591 -8% 13,668 15,694 -13%
2001 2,914 6,176 -53% 2,329 4,456 -48% 2,779 3,233 -14% 2,073 2,145 -3% 7,865 11,079 -29% 3,680 4,813 -24%
2002 5,968 9,092 -34% 4,428 7,650 -42% 5,371 8,129 -34% 2,491 4,915 -49% 12,816 15,344 -16% 5,597 7,600 -26%
2003 10,123 12,023 -16% 8,350 10,921 -24% 4,240 6,932 -39% 2,000 2,679 -25% 13,766 18,023 -24% 6,494 9,151 -29%
2004 5,782 10,252 -44% 4,888 8,804 -44% 2,221 3,884 -43% 1,133 1,348 -16% 3,037 6,069 -50% 1,133 1,348 -16%
Total 6,668 9,313 -28% 5,566 7,981 -30% 2,956 4,470 -34% 1,539 2,218 -31% 13,107 16,221 -19% 6,114 7,721 -21%
Number of Farms Experiencing Shortfalls (Shortfall >0)
2000 13 15 -13% 13 14 -7% 1 1 0% 0 0 - 20 20 0% 15 16 -6%
2001 8 14 -43% 7 14 -50% 2 4 -50% 2 2 0% 13 17 -24% 5 10 -50%
2002 10 12 -17% 7 11 -36% 7 10 -30% 4 7 -43% 14 17 -18% 9 10 -10%
2003 15 16 -6% 14 15 -7% 6 9 -33% 3 4 -25% 13 14 -7% 5 10 -50%
2004 10 17 -41% 10 13 -23% 4 9 -56% 1 2 -50% 7 14 -50% 1 2 -50%
Total 56 74 -24% 51 67 -24% 20 33 -39% 10 15 -33% 67 82 -18% 35 48 -27%
Standard Deviation
2000 18,401 18,384 0% 17,014 17,054 0% 931 931 0% 0 0 - 35,589 37,434 -5% 21,854 24,029 -9%
2001 6,376 9,118 -30% 5,270 7,370 -28% 14,506 14,714 -1% 11,023 11,183 -1% 22,090 22,758 -3% 17,579 17,565 0%
2002 15,264 16,965 -10% 13,647 15,320 -11% 14,448 18,606 -22% 8,668 12,261 -29% 21,792 22,894 -5% 12,807 14,549 -12%
2003 19,474 20,400 -5% 16,868 19,023 -11% 12,727 14,160 -10% 7,890 8,830 -11% 29,513 32,338 -9% 17,303 19,828 -13%
2004 11,863 16,330 -27% 10,420 14,698 -29% 9,575 10,562 -9% 6,203 6,275 -1% 10,245 11,896 -14% 6,203 6,275 -1%
Total 15,053 16,569 -9% 13,400 15,157 -12% 11,589 13,358 -13% 7,660 8,893 -14% 26,361 27,840 -5% 16,387 17,914 -9%
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Table 15. Continued.
Maximum
2000 87,206 87,206 79,691 79,691 5,102 5,102 - - 130,564 145,723 83,987 99,146
2001 24,596 36,905 19,837 32,147 79,491 80,362 60,408 61,279 119,920 119,920 96,442 96,442
2002 76,266 76,266 71,779 71,779 66,878 73,473 44,504 51,099 69,365 73,473 46,991 51,098
2003 77,708 77,708 75,158 75,158 62,108 62,108 41,858 41,858 139,530 148,653 74,928 84,051
2004 41,436 54,715 38,783 50,263 52,234 52,234 33,977 33,977 52,234 52,234 33,977 33,977
Total 87,206 87,206 79,691 79,691 79,491 80,362 60,408 61,279 139,530 148,653 96,442 99,146
* Scenario 90_gross, 80_gross, 90_index, and 80_index are abbreviated as 90_G, 80_G, 90_I, and 80_I
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C ounter Cyclical Savings A ccounts
Counter-cyclical (CC) savings accounts have been proposed as an alternative to FARRM 
accounts. Several features of the counter-cyclical savings account proposal differ from 
the FARRM account proposal. First, gross income is used to determine eligibility for CC 
accounts. Second, deposits to the account are matched up to the lesser of 2% of a gross 
income target or $5,000. Third, the withdrawal of funds is limited to instances when 
gross income falls below a trigger point and can only be used to increase gross income to 
the trigger level.
The CC account proposal would utilize a tax-based measure of gross income for purposes 
of eligibility and determining the amount of the matching deposit from the government. 
The measure of gross income used in the analysis is defined as:
(16) gross income = IRS Form 1040 Schedule F  income
= cash receipts from the sale o f farm products
CC Accounts: Analysis of Gross Income Variability
Since the CC proposal would base contributions and withdrawals on gross income, the 
variability in gross income will determine grower participation. The variation in gross 
income was assessed by examining the distribution of IRS Form 1040 Schedule F gross 
income (Table 16). The average gross income increased steadily over time. The relative 
variability in gross income is less in the case of net income. For the case of net income, 
the standard deviation was greater than the mean, while here the standard deviation is 
much less than the mean but sizable nonetheless. It is also useful to note that the 
correspondence between gross and net income is not perfect. For instance, net income 
fell substantially from 2003 to 2004 (27%), while gross income increased modestly at the 
same period.
Table 16. Descriptive Statistics for Schedule F Gross Income by Year, 32 Grape Farms 
in Lake Erie Region._____________________________________________________
Year Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
2000 $152,973 $97,492 $12,709 $401,831
2001 $157,796 $110,679 $12,362 $430,782
2002 $159,527 $121,766 $12,537 $537,476
2003 $161,828 $113,883 $15,194 $432,762
2004 $176,779 $139,871 $11,595 $546,251
CC Accounts: Eligibility and Participation Incentives
The eligibility question is slightly different for the case of Counter-Cyclical accounts as 
opposed to FARRM accounts. Farmers can establish a farm counter-cyclical savings 
account as long as average gross income exceeds $50,000 over the last five years. That is,
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i+4
2  (gross income) 1994+i
(17) Eligible in year (1999+ i), i f  — ----------5---------------> $50,000, i = 1,2,3 ,4,5
Five growers in the sample were never eligible to make a contribution to CC accounts in 
the 5-year period. That is, 84.3% of farms were eligible to establish CC accounts. 
Therefore, there are 27 farms included in the analysis of CC accounts. One farm was 
eligible to make a contribution on three occasions while the rest of farms (96.3%) were 
eligible to make a contribution up to 5 times (Table 17). Also, 100% of farmers were 
eligible to make contributions to the accounts from 2002-2004, while one farm was not 
eligible to make a contribution in 2000 and 2001 (Table 18).
Table 17. Percent of Farms with Income Enabling them to Contribute to CC Accounts, 27 
Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region, 2000-2004._________________________________
Number of Years Qualified to Contribute % of Farms
1 -
2 -
3 3.7
4 -
5 96.3
Deposits to CC Accounts
Farmers are allowed to contribution any amount they desire to a CC account. The 
government would provide a matching deposit. However, the matching deposit would be 
limited to 2 percent of gross income of the producer and could not exceed $5,000 for any 
applicable year. Funds deposited to the account could earn interest at the market rate. 
Since earnings on these accounts are distributed and taxed annually, farmers have little 
incentive to put money in CC accounts that is not matched by the government. The funds 
could be invested in other accounts with fewer restrictions on withdrawal. In the analysis 
that follows, it is assumed that farmers will only contribute enough funds to maximize the 
potential government matching deposit. Specifically, the deposit was defined according 
to (18).
(18) depositj= Min [0.02(gross income)t ,5000] in any given year i
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Table 18 presents the average deposits. These deposits can also be interpreted as the 
average government matching costs. The farms were able to contribute around $3,200 
per year. The amounts of average contribution did not vary considerably over time. The 
average contribution allows one to determine the extent to which the farmer was able to 
take full advantage of the maximum government matching deposit of $5,000. As 
analyzed, growers with the financial means or cash flow who wished to contribute the 
full $5,000 were only allowed to do so if the applicable gross income measure was at 
least $250,000. Growers with less gross income were only allowed to contribute 2% of 
their gross income. The analysis shows that on average, 21% of farms in the entire period 
could contribute $5,000 to take full advantage of the maximum government matching 
deposit.
Table 18. Percent of Farms Eligible to Contribute to CC Accounts and Deposit Summary
of CC Accounts per Year, 27 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.
Eligible Deposit
Year % of Farms Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
2000 96.3 $3,252 $1,449 $0 $5,000
2001 96.3 $3,237 $1,545 $0 $5,000
2002 100 $3,189 $1,439 $995 $5,000
2003 100 $3,252 $1,377 $1,334 $5,000
2004 100 $3,274 $1,315 $1,188 $5,000
All Year 98.5 $3,241 $1,406 $0 $5,000
Participation Incentives
Counter-Cyclical accounts do not rely upon tax incentives and do not provide interest rate 
bonuses to encourage grower participation. The government’s promise to match deposits 
provides the economic incentive for contribution to a CC account. Once deposited to the 
CC account, funds could be withdrawn only if gross income for the current year dropped 
below the income target. The amount that could be withdrawn from the account is limited 
to the amount needed to increase current gross income up to the income target.
Restrictions on access to the funds would most likely make growers contribute only 
enough funds to be eligible for the full government matching deposit. Although the return 
to a dollar eligible for matching and deposited in the account is 100% (through the 
matching government deposit), in the cases of short cash flows, the restriction on 
withdrawal would make growers deposit less than the estimates in Table 18. Specifically, 
this is a serious concern for farms that are experiencing growth in revenues over time. If 
these funds cannot be accessed in times of need they are likely less valuable to the 
farmer.
25
CC Accounts: Withdrawals and Benefits
Unlike FARRM accounts, the funds deposited in a CC account cannot be withdrawn at 
the producer’s discretion. Instead, the funds can only be withdrawn when gross income 
falls below 80 % or 90% level of income target. The analysis in the section and next 
section focuses on estimating how frequently farmers can withdraw funds from CC 
accounts under two measures income target levels, how many dollars they would need to 
withdraw in order to increase their income to the target level, and how many dollars they 
have available in the CC accounts.
Before presenting the results it is useful to present the assumptions and methods used to 
calculate the need for withdrawals and actual withdrawals. First, the analysis presented 
assumes that farmers can make a deposit and withdrawal in the same period. In other 
words, the farmer could place a deposit in the account to be matched in the current year. 
If the current year income is less than 80% or 90% of the target, the farmer could also 
withdraw enough funds from the account to increase income to the 80% or 90% level. 
The matching government contribution makes it attractive for farmers to contribute and 
withdraw in the same year. The need for funds to be withdrawn from the accounts is 
given by (19).
(19) needi = Max (<fi* t arg ett gross incomei ),0 , ^=0.9 or 0.8
where target is the income target generated by one of the measures defined by equations 
(20)-(22). The measure of income target in equation (20) was defined to represent a 5- 
year rolling average of gross income.
4+ j
^  gross income1994+i
(20) targetI999+j = —---------5-------------  j  = 1,2,3,4,5
To recognize the growth of farm business, using the five-year rolling average income as 
the income target might not represent the most recent gross income and therefore 
understate growers’ effective need. As with the FARRM account case the indexing 
procedure used with the Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) Crop Insurance Program was 
used to index gross income3. This indexed income target is calculated according to the 
procedure described in the FARRM account section (page 13-14).
Withdrawals in any period are chosen to satisfy the need for income given that the most 
that can be withdrawn is the sum of the previous periods balance and the total deposits 
(government and farmer) in the current period (21).
3 A description of AGR and the income indexing procedure can be found on the USDA, Risk Management 
Agency website, RMA (http://www.rma.usda.gov/) or is available from the authors.
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(21) withdrawal
Min\needi, balancei-1 + 2 * depositi ] 
0 , otherwise
if  needt > 0
Finally, the balance in the account at the end of each period is determined by (22).
(22) balance i = balance i- 1  + 2* depositi -  withdrawali
Regarding certain design parameters for the effective CC programs, the measures of 
income target were constructed for both gross income and indexed gross income. Two 
measures of income target plus another parameter, $ in equation (19) assumed equal to 
0.9 or 0.8 to represent the level of income target, provide the four scenarios for the 
analysis of CC accounts. Four scenarios can be denoted as 90_gross ($=.9, target), 
80_gross ($=.8, target), 90_index ($=0.9, index target), and 80_index ($=.8, index 
target).
Results of Withdrawals and Benefits
We first examine how frequently growers would be eligible to withdraw deposited funds 
from the account. An indicator variable was created for each of the four scenarios. This 
variable was recorded as a one if the farmer would be eligible to withdraw funds from the 
account and a zero otherwise. The analysis shows that the frequencies eligible to 
withdraw funds depends critically on the measures of income target and $ used to 
calculate the need.
Table 19 shows the percent of growers eligible to withdraw funds from the CC accounts 
by year. Table 20 shows how frequently individual farms were eligible to withdraw from 
the accounts over the five-year period. Since the 90% income target is higher than the 
80% income target, growers would have the need to withdraw funds more frequently 
under the scenarios with a 90% target.
Table 19. Percent of Farms Eligible to Withdraw Funds from CC Accounts, 27 Grape 
Farms in Lake Erie Region.______________________________________________
Withdrawal Scenarios
Year 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 3.7 0.0 63.0 51.9
2001 7.4 3.7 48.1 25.9
2002 29.6 22.2 55.6 33.3
2003 33.3 14.8 51.9 37.0
2004 25.9 3.7 44.4 3.7
Entire Period 20.0 8.9 52.6 30.4
27
Using indexed gross income trigger increased the likelihood of withdrawals from the 
accounts. For instance, the 90_index and 80_index scenarios produced frequencies 
eligible to withdraw funds more than 2 times higher than those in the scenarios 90_gross 
and 80_gross (Table 19). Also, the indexed targets substantially reduced the number of 
growers that were unable to make withdrawals from the accounts (Table 20).
Table 20. Percent of Farms Eligible to Withdraw Funds from CC Accounts, 27 Grape 
Farms in Lake Erie Region, 2000-2004.____________________________________
Number of years Withdrawal Scenarios
eligible to 
withdrawing funds 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
0 yr 44.4 63.0 - 14.8
1 yr 22.2 33.3 22.2 33.3
2 yrs 22.2 - 14.8 40.7
3 yrs 11.1 3.7 48.1 7.4
4 yrs - - 7.4 3.7
5 yrs - - 7.4 -
The average withdrawals in the scenario 90_index and 80_index are around 2 times 
greater than those in the scenarios 90_gross and 80_gross (Table 21). The average 
withdrawal for the entire period in the scenario 90_index, $4,486 was even higher than 
the average deposit for the entire period, $3,241 meaning that the farms would be able to 
withdraw some of the government’s matching deposits (Table 18 & 21).
Table 21. Average Withdrawals from CC Accounts, 27 Grape Farms in Lake Erie 
Region.
Withdrawal Scenarios
Year 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 $189 $0 $4,381 $3,386
2001 $822 $440 $3,036 $1,536
2002 $3,486 $3,073 $4,623 $3,400
2003 $4,498 $1,338 $6,584 $5,226
2004 $2,084 $166 $3,807 $166
Entire Period $2,216 $1,003 $4,486 $2,743
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When one considers the average final balances remaining in the accounts it is obvious 
that most growers except those under scenario 90_index are able to build sizable account 
balances over a 5- year period. This is understandable as there were few withdrawals 
from the accounts. Furthermore, in the scenarios of 90_gross and 80_gross, there were 
several farms that did not withdraw any funds from the accounts and built balances up to 
$50,000 that reflected the maximum contributions and government matches (Table 22).
Table 22. Summary of Final Balances in CC Accounts, 27 Grape Farms in Lake Erie 
Region.
Balance Scenarios Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
90_gross $21,330 $17,084 $17,856 $50,000 $0
80_gross $27,392 $22,877 $16,748 $50,000 $0
90 index $9,978 $7,702 $9,905 $40,000 $0
80 index $18,695 $15,950 $13,662 $49,411 $0
CC Accounts: Income Shortfalls and Stabilization
While some farms could build positive account balances, a significant number of farms 
that experienced a drop in income would not have a large enough balance to return 
income to the target level. To examine if growers build sufficient account balances to 
insure against variability in farm income, we first calculate the amount of shortfall for CC 
accounts, which is defined by (23).
(23) shortfalli = need.i - balance_  + 2* depositt , if  need.i > 0 and shortfall i > 0 
= 0, otherwise
As with the case of FARRM accounts, the shortfall reflects the situation where the 
balance in the account is insufficient to allow the grower to increase income to the target 
level. An indicator variable was created to count the frequencies of the shortfall (zero 
balance) for each of the four scenarios. This variable was recorded as a one if the shortfall 
is greater than zero and a zero otherwise.
Table 23 shows that the percent of growers with shortfall for each year of the study. The 
frequencies of shortfall under the four scenarios are highly correlated with the 
frequencies eligible to withdraw funds from CC accounts shown in Table 19. Using 
indexing gross income as withdrawal trigger would significantly increase the frequencies 
of shortfalls as well as the frequencies of withdrawal. The frequencies of the shortfall in 
the scenarios of 90_gross and 80_gross are substantially less than the scenarios of 
90_index and 80_index.
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Over the entire period 41.5% of times growers in the scenario 90_index had shortfalls for, 
while only 10.4% of growers in the scenario 90_gross experienced a shortfall. Table 24 
shows the conditional average shortfall calculated as E\shortfall\shortfalli > 0], which
indicates the average amount of insufficient funds after withdrawing from the accounts 
when a shortfall occurs. The average shortfalls over the entire period range from $22,965 
(scenario 80_gross) to $31,668 (scenarios 90_index). The conditional average shortfalls 
vary by year as well as by the scenarios because large amounts of shortfall occurred for 
some of individual farms in a year or in a scenario. For example, the scenarios of 
90_gross and 80_gross had one grower (3.7%) experiencing the shortfall in 2001, but this 
grower also caused the highest average shortfalls, $68,477 in scenario 90_gross and 
$49,395 in the scenario 80_gross across the four scenarios during the entire period.
Table 23. Percent of Farms Experiencing Shortfall, 27 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.
Shortfall Scenarios
Year 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 - - 63.0 40.7
2001 3.7 3.7 40.7 11.1
2002 22.2 14.8 40.7 22.2
2003 14.8 7.4 44.4 18.5
2004 11.1 3.7 18.5 3.7
Entire period 10.4 5.9 41.5 19.3
Table 24. Average Annual Shortfall, 27 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region.
Shortfall Scenarios
Year 90 gross 80 gross 90 index 80 index
2000 - - $46,080 $33,883
2001 $68,477 $49,395 $21,046 $30,722
2002 $23,574 $15,142 $29,742 $22,049
2003 $21,623 $22,129 $30,244 $26,683
2004 $16,493 $29,494 $13,693 $29,494
Entire period $24,707 $22,965 $31,668 $29,234
To examine the impact of the CC accounts on the stabilization of grower incomes, we 
estimate and compare the shortfall with and without CC accounts under the four 
scenarios. The amount of shortfall with the existence of a CC account has been defined as 
(23). We assume that without a CC account, farmers would experience shortfalls when 
gross income is less than 80% level or 90% level of the target. That is, the need defined 
as (19) is greater than zero when a shortfall occurs. The amount of shortfall without the 
existence of a CC account is defined as (24).
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(24) ShortfallJjasei = need.i, i f  need, > 0
= 0, otherwise
Table 25 shows the average shortfall, number of farms experiencing shortfalls (shortfall 
>0), standard deviation of shortfall, and the maximum shortfall with and without the 
existence of CC accounts. To compare the shortfalls with and without CC accounts, we 
calculate the change of the average shortfall, standard deviation of shortfall, and number 
of farms experiencing shortfalls when the CC accounts exist. Those changes can be 
interpreted as the degrees of income stabilization. Under the four scenarios, the CC 
accounts reduced 25% to 46% of the average shortfall, 23% to 48% of number of farms 
experiencing shortfalls, and 13% to 30% of standard deviation of shortfall over the entire 
period.
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Table 25. Summary of the Shortfall with and without CC Accounts, 27 Grape Farms in Lake Erie Region, Continued.
Shortfall Scenarios with / without FARRM Accounts
90_gross 90_gross 80_gross 80_gross 90_Index 90_Index 80_Index 80_Index
Year _CC _base Change _CC _base Change _CC _base Change _CC _base Change
Mean
2000 - $189 -100 - - - $29,013 $33,394 -13 $13,804 $17,191 -20
2001 $2,536 $3,358 -24 $1,829 $2,270 -19 $8,574 $11,611 -26 $3,414 $4,950 -31
2002 $5,239 $8,724 -40 $2,243 $5,317 -58 $12,117 $16,740 -28 $4,900 $8,299 -41
2003 $3,203 $7,702 -58 $1,639 $2,977 -45 $13,442 $20,026 -33 $4,941 $10,168 -51
2004 $1,833 $3,917 -53 $1,092 $1,258 -13 $2,536 $6,343 -60 $1,092 $1,258 -13
Total $2,562 $4,778 -46 $1,361 $2,364 -42 $13,136 $17,623 -25 $5,630 $8,373 -33
Number of Farms Experiencing Shortfalls (Shortfall >0)
2000 - 1 -100 - - - 17 17 0 11 14 -21
2001 1 2 -50 1 1 0 11 14 -21 3 8 -63
2002 6 8 -25 4 6 -33 11 15 -27 6 9 -33
2003 4 9 -56 2 4 -50 12 14 -14 5 10 -50
2004 3 7 -57 1 1 0 5 12 -58 1 1 0
Total 14 27 -48 8 12 -33 56 72 -22 26 42 -38
Standard Deviation
2000 - $982 -100 - - - $35,369 $38,481 -8 $21,867 $24,909 -12
2001 $13,178 $15,516 -15 $9,506 $11,793 -19 $22,655 $23,941 -5 $16,633 $18,514 -10
2002 $12,799 $19,525 -34 $6,445 $12,869 -50 $20,804 $23,731 -12 $10,385 $15,186 -32
2003 $11,466 $14,747 -22 $7,212 $9,276 -22 $24,952 $33,538 -26 $12,547 $20,683 -39
2004 $9,181 $11,045 -17 $5,676 $6,539 -13 $9,588 $12,436 -23 $6,539 -13
Total $10,503 $14,014 -25 $6,522 $9,344 -30 $25,353 $28,990 -13 $14,933 $18,757 -20
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Table 25. Continued.
Maximum
2000 $5,102 $135,723 $145,723 $89,146 $99,146
2001 $68,477 $80,362 $49,395 $61,279 $116,265 $119,920 $86,501 $96,442
2002 $51,161 $73,473 $28,787 $51,099 $62,300 $73,473 $34,210 $51,098
2003 $57,302 $62,108 $37,053 $41,858 $108,653 $148,653 $44,051 $84,051
2004 $47,751 $52,234 $29,494 $33,977 $47,751 $52,234 $29,494 $33,977
Total $68,477 $80,362 $49,395 $61,279 $135,723 $148,653 $89,146 $99,146
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C onclusions
The research project evaluated two specific farm savings account proposals, counter­
cyclical farm savings (CC) accounts and farm and ranch risk management (FARRM) 
accounts. Both proposals require that the farmer deposit funds into the account. Under 
the counter-cyclical savings accounts program, eligibility is based upon gross income, the 
government would match the farmer’s deposit up to $5,000, and farmers could withdraw 
when gross income fell below a specified trigger level. For FARRM accounts, eligibility 
to participate was based upon having positive net income and deposits were not matched, 
but rather were tax deferred. Withdrawals from the accounts were evaluated using 
various historical gross and net income trigger levels. The objectives of study were to 
assess the ability of growers to contribute to the accounts, the ability of growers to 
withdraw funds from the accounts, and the ability of the accounts to reduce income 
variability.
The findings suggested that the eligibility rules for the proposed CC accounts are not 
restrictive as most farms would be eligible to make a contribution every year. The 
positive net income eligibility criterion for FARRM accounts is much more restrictive 
and will significantly reduce the number of farms eligible to contribute to savings 
accounts. Specifically, the study found that 90% of the farms would be eligible to 
contribute to CC accounts in all five years of the study. This is not surprising because 
eligibility only required 1040 Schedule F gross income in excess of $50,000. Eligibility 
to make deposits to FARRM accounts was noticeably lower as this program required the 
farm to have positive 1040 Schedule F net income. In the case of FARRM accounts only 
36% of the farms would be eligible to make deposits in all 5 years. However, all of the 
farms were eligible to contribute to FARRM accounts in at least one year and 87% were 
eligible to make deposits in three of the five years.
The study also examined the magnitude of deposits to the accounts. The average annual 
farmer contribution to CC accounts was $3,042. Based on a maximum deposit rate of 2% 
of gross income, many of the specialty crop farms in this study were unable to take 
advantage of the full $5,000 government match. In other words, many had sales less than 
$250,000. The analysis shows that on average, 21% of farms in the entire period could 
contribute $5,000 to take full advantage of the maximum government matching deposit. 
The average deposit over the period was $3,042. With the government match this would 
result in an average annual deposit to the account of $6,084.
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Unlike CC accounts, where every contribution is matched up to $5,000, many farms have 
little incentive to participate in FARRM accounts because the incentives are based 
completely on tax deferral. Based on farm income alone, nearly half of the farms are in 
10% or lower marginal federal income tax bracket. There are two important financial 
incentives to encourage farmer participation in FARRM accounts. The most basic benefit 
is the deferral of tax liability for one year or more. The ability to defer taxes to a tax year 
in which the farm is in a lower tax bracket would result in lower taxes, creating an 
incentive for contribution to a FARRM account. For instance, a farmer could contribute 
to a FARRM account in a year in which the income would be taxed at the 27% marginal 
tax bracket and then withdraw the funds in a year where they find themselves in a lower 
tax bracket. Second, the farmer is able to invest the deferred taxes, earning interest on the 
balances. The results of the study show that this benefit is quite small on average due to 
relatively small balances and low interest rates.
The marginal tax bracket plays a critical role in determining the value of FARRM 
accounts. Larger and more profitable farms will receive the greatest benefits from the 
FARRM account program because these farms are more likely to be in higher marginal 
tax brackets. The greatest benefit obtained from FARRM accounts occurs when farmers 
can contribute in years with a high tax liability and withdraw in years with a reduced tax 
liability. Although most farmers have a positive net income, many face a relatively low 
marginal tax rate. Based only on farm income, 24% would typically be found with a 0% 
marginal tax rate, meaning that they would owe no federal income tax, and 20% would 
find themselves in the 10% marginal tax bracket. This would significantly reduce their 
incentive for participation in the program. On the other hand 16% of the farms generated 
farm income that would place them in the 27% federal tax bracket. These farms would 
have a much greater incentive to participate in the program. This structure makes the 
program of much more value to large and profitable farms.
Farms were allowed to place up to 20% of 1040 Schedule F Net farm income into 
FARRM accounts, without regard to their current tax bracket. Under this assumption, the 
average FARRM account deposit was $4,526. When the government match is 
considered, the average CC account balance was larger than the average FARRM account 
balance. However, as modeled, the FARRM account balances are more variable and 
large farms are able to place considerably more funds in FARRM accounts than in CC 
accounts. The average amount of funds deposited by the farmer was greater under 
FARRM accounts than for CC accounts. Here, the average annual deposit was $4,526. 
Because the farmer’s deposit was not matched, the total amount placed in the account 
was generally lower for FARRM accounts than for CC accounts.
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While the FARRM account proposal allows farmers to make withdrawals at their 
discretion, the CC account proposal places conditions on when the farmer can make a 
withdrawal. These withdrawal provisions on the accounts are critical. If withdrawal 
triggers are not indexed to allow for growth, few farms will be able to make withdrawals. 
Restrictive withdrawal rules will significantly reduce the appeal of the accounts as a risk 
management tool. The results of the study indicate that this is a critical feature of the CC 
program. Higher gross income withdrawal triggers increase the likelihood that a farm 
can make a withdrawal. For instance, an 80% gross income trigger would typically allow 
8% of the farms to make a withdrawal in a given year and a 90% trigger would allow 
20% to make a withdrawal. Additionally, indexing the gross income trigger to adjust for 
changes in farm size allows more farms to make withdrawals. Here, 30% of the farms 
would be able to make a withdrawal under an 80% indexed gross income trigger and 52% 
would be able to make a withdrawal under a 90% indexed gross income trigger.
The analysis of the FARRM account program included a comparison of withdrawals 
under both gross and net income triggers. The use of a net income trigger versus a gross 
income trigger does not appear to significantly alter the likelihood of making a 
withdrawal. As a result, a gross income trigger is likely preferred because it is more 
easily indexed than a net income trigger. When a 90% indexed gross income trigger was 
used, slightly over half the farms were able to make a withdrawal. A 90% net income 
trigger resulted in 48% of the farms being able to make a withdrawal.
The ability of the accounts to manage income variability was assessed by comparing the 
amount by which income fell short of the gross or net income trigger level with and 
without the accounts. Farm savings accounts show some promise in addressing income 
variability, but restrictions on the size of the deposits limits their ability to completely 
mitigate income variability. Many farms will still experience considerable income 
variability. The accounts also appear unable to handle back-to-back adverse financial 
outcomes.
While some farms could build positive account balances over the 5 years of the study, a 
significant number of farms that experienced a drop in income sufficient to trigger a 
withdrawal did not have a large enough account balance to resolve their income shortfall. 
Under a 90% indexed income withdrawal trigger, nearly 40% of the farms would be 
unable to completely manage their income shortfall with the CC savings account. 
Additionally, the resulting zero balance in the savings account would leave these growers 
with little financial protection for the next year. Still, the CC accounts reduced the typical 
shortfall from the income trigger by 25 to 46%, which shows considerable promise in 
managing income risk. Similar results were found for the FARRM accounts, although 
the reduction in income was slightly smaller due to smaller account balances.
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Although many farms did not have sufficient funds to manage their income risk, many 
finished the five year study period with positive account balances. Including the 
government match, the average ending balance in the CC accounts with a 90% indexed 
income withdrawal trigger was $9,425. The ending balance in the FARRM accounts with 
a 90% indexed gross income withdrawal trigger was $7,199.
While the savings accounts were able to reduce income variability, the funds in the 
accounts were often insufficient to completely mitigate income variability. Unless larger 
subsidies are offered, savings account programs are unlikely to provide a complete risk 
management solution for specialty crop growers. Additionally, for widest appeal the 
program should combine both government deposit matching and tax deferral of deposits.
While the tax deferral benefits of the FARRM account will appeal to high income farms, 
the relatively small amount government matching for CC accounts will provide little 
income protection for larger farms. The most useful program would likely combine both 
tax deferral and government matching of deposits. This would broaden the appeal of the 
accounts and make them a more viable risk management tool for larger farms.
The accounts will provide little protection in successive low-income years. This is a 
critical concern because agriculture often undergoes multiple year price cycles. In this 
situation additional emergency government deposits to the accounts would likely be 
necessary to reduce income shortfalls. In fact, the juice grape industry experienced three 
consecutive years of declining prices in 2002-2004 and although data are not available 
for 2005 it is unlikely that prices increased significantly. Finally, the analysis assumed 
that farmers would have the available cash flow to invest in the accounts. Unless the 
farmers postpone investment or use additional debt, many would be unable to fully fund 
the accounts. These concerns aside, the accounts show promise in providing a component 
of a comprehensive farm income safety net.
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